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I. INTRODUCTION
Although 2017 was a legislative year in Texas, no changes were made to
the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code).1 This
Survey, therefore, is devoted to a discussion of recent cases analyzing and
* Retired Professor of Law, Texas Tech University; B.A., J.D., University of Iowa;
L.L.M. Harvard University. Professor Krahmer passed away in April 2018 during the re-
view of this article. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the editors alone, who
are deeply grateful for Professor Krahmer’s steadfast support of the Survey by his many
contributions over the last twenty-eight years.
1. The Code first became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966, as a separate statute. See
Unif. Commercial Code, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 721, § 1-101, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1. It was
reenacted in 1967 as part of the Texas Business & Commerce Code, the first of the codes
promulgated under the Texas Codification Act. In that process, the designation of “Arti-
cle” in the Official Text was changed to “Chapter,” subsections were designated by letters
rather than numbers, and a period instead of a dash was used to designate sections. Thus,
for example, § 2-204(1) in the Official Text became § 2.204(a) in the Texas codification.
Revisions of the Code that have taken place since 1967 still substitute “Chapter” for “Arti-
cle,” and still use a period instead of a dash, but now use the Official Text system for
designating subsections. See, e.g., Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995
Tex. Gen. Laws 4582 (effective on Jan. 1, 1996). As currently enacted, Chapter 2 is the only
chapter of the Code that retains the older non-uniform system to designate subsections. In
the grand scheme of things, this is a minor point, but it can be confusing when doing Code
research and in correlating the text of the Official Comments (which have not been
adopted in Texas as part of the Code itself) to the statutory provisions. It can also affect
searching on Westlaw and Lexis if the searcher is trying to track case interpretations of
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applying various provisions of the Code. The cases are discussed in an
order paralleling the chapters in the Code.
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS
In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc.,2 the Texas Supreme
Court held that the Code definition of “conspicuous” should be applied
to both Code and non-Code cases. Numerous cases have since followed
that mandate.3 During the Survey period, in McKinney/Pearl Restaurant
Partners, L.P. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas determined that a landlord’s waiver of
liability for “consequential, punitive or special damages” was not conspic-
uous.4 Although the tenant won this battle, it lost the war on another
ground because the tenant had actual knowledge of the waiver based on
information provided by the tenant’s counsel and signed two lease
amendments acknowledging existence of the waiver.5 McKinney/Pearl is
a good recent example on the treatment of waivers and disclaimers under
Texas law.
III. SALE OF GOODS
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section 2.201 of the Code requires contracts for the sale of goods for a
price of $500 or more to be evidenced by a signed writing unless the con-
tract falls within one of the exceptions to the writing requirement.6 In
Duradril, L.L.C. v. Dynomax Drilling Tools, Inc.,7 a manufacturer and a
particular Code sections because of the variation in section and subsection designations
over the years.
2. 853 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex. 1993).
3. See, e.g., Coppock v. Nat’l Seating & Mobility, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 3d 661, 668 (W.D.
Tex. 2015) (disclaimer of warranty in bold face type appearing above signature block was
conspicuous); Dewayne Rogers Logging, Inc. v. Propac Indus., Ltd., 299 S.W.3d 374, 390
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, pet. denied) (disclaimer of warranties was effective when set out
in boldface capital letters); Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving, Inc., 264 S.W.3d 875, 879
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (limitation of liability clause in moving company’s
contract was conspicuous); Am. Home Shield Corp. v. Lahorgue, 201 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (indemnity agreement was not conspicuous in home re-
pair agreement).
4. McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 241 F. Supp. 3d 737,
755 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
5. Id. Even if a clause is not conspicuous, actual knowledge of a waiver, disclaimer, or
the like will make a clause effective. Id. The Texas Supreme Court recognized this excep-
tion in Dresser by reference to its earlier decision in Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559,
562 (Tex. 1990), where the court stated, in the context of a warranty disclaimer in a sale of
goods contract, “[w]hen the buyer is not surprised by the disclaimer, insisting on compli-
ance with the conspicuousness requirement serves no purpose. The extent of a buyer’s
knowledge of a disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability is thus clearly rele-
vant to a determination of its enforceability.” Id. at 562 (internal citations omitted).
6. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(a) (West 2009). The exceptions listed in
§ 2.201 include (1) a confirmation sent between merchants to which no objection is made;
(2) specially manufactured goods; (3) admissions by a party that a contract was made; and
(3) full or partial performance of the contract. Id. § 2.201(b)–(c).
7. 516 S.W.3d 147, 154–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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distributor entered into an agreement naming the distributor as the exclu-
sive distributor of the manufacturer’s products in the United States. The
agreement included a minimum distribution requirement. Between 2009
and 2013, the distributor failed to meet the requirements and, in 2013, the
parties sought to remedy the default by entering into an “Asset Purchase
Agreement,” (APA) under which the manufacturer would acquire vari-
ous assets of the distributor to satisfy the outstanding debt. A few months
later, the manufacturer learned the distributor had violated the APA by
transferring certain assets that were encumbered by liens and filed suit on
several grounds, including breach of contract. The distributor defended
the breach of contract claim on the theory that the APA did not satisfy
the statute of frauds. Tracking the language of Sections 2.201 and 2.204 of
the Code, the trial court instructed the jury that part performance would
satisfy the statute of frauds. Based on this instruction, the jury found that
the statute of frauds had been satisfied, and the trial court ruled in favor
of the manufacturer. On appeal by the distributor, the Fourteenth Hous-
ton Court of Appeals approved the jury instruction form.8 The court of
appeals then reviewed the evidence supporting the jury’s finding and con-
cluded the evidence supported the verdict.9 Judgment was affirmed in
favor of the manufacturer.10
In Al-Sabban v. Ritell,11 a purchaser wire transferred funds to a bank as
a down payment on the purchase of an aircraft. There was some confu-
sion about the account to which the funds were to be sent, and they en-
ded up in a third party’s account who was not involved in the aircraft
purchase.12 Part of the funds were withdrawn by the third party and were
allegedly used to purchase an automobile.13 When the aircraft purchaser
learned about the withdrawal, he contacted his bank, and it made a de-
mand on the receiving bank for return of the funds.14 The receiving bank
interpled the funds.15 Both the aircraft purchaser and the third party as-
serted claims to the funds. During the course of the litigation, the third
party admitted that he had no documents or other evidence showing the
existence of a contract with the aircraft purchaser.16 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in
favor of the aircraft purchaser on his claim to the interpled funds, and
also entered judgment against the third-party defendant for the amount
that had been withdrawn from the account to which the funds had been
wire transferred.17
8. Id. at 159–60.
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id. at 170.
11. No. H-15-1570-CV, 2017 WL 771076 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2017).
12. Id. at *3.
13. Id. at *1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *3.
17. Id. at *4.
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B. BATTLE OF THE FORMS
Under the common law “mirror image rule,” if the terms in an accept-
ance did not match the terms in an offer, the acceptance was treated as a
counteroffer. Unless the counteroffer was itself accepted, no contract was
formed.18 Section 2.207 of the Code radically changes this approach to
permit an “expression of acceptance” to operate “as an acceptance” even
if the terms in the acceptance do not match the terms of the offer.19 Sec-
tion 2.207 goes on to provide a series of rules by which non-matching
terms should be tested to determine if they become part of the contract.20
In Stelluti Kerr, L.L.C. v. Mapei Corp.,21 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit discussed applying § 2.207 in a situation where an “ex-
pression of acceptance” differed materially from the terms contained in a
price quotation. In Stelluti, a seller sent a price quotation to a prospective
buyer proposing an arrangement to give the buyer the right to distribute
improved plastic bagging machines the seller would purchase from a
third-party manufacturer for delivery to the buyer. During the following
year, the parties discussed various issues about the design and production
of the product. These discussions resulted in a revised and very detailed
price quotation for the sale of fourteen of the new machines. The buyer
returned a purchase order for only one machine. After this machine was
delivered and installed, disputes arose between the manufacturer of the
machines, the seller, and the buyer about the purchase of the thirteen
additional machines. The seller sued both the manufacturer and the buyer
in state court for breach of contract. Following removal to federal court,
the seller’s claim against the manufacturer was resolved by arbitration in
the seller’s favor. The seller then reopened proceedings against the buyer
in the federal district court. The jury found in favor of the seller, but the
district court granted the buyer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
based on the court’s view that the verdict was “against the weight and
preponderance of the evidence.”22 On appeal by the seller, the Fifth Cir-
cuit pointed out that § 2.207 abrogates the common law mirror image rule
and allows a varying acceptance to operate as a binding acceptance, un-
less it provides “unambiguous notice that it is a rejection or counter-of-
fer.”23 Applying this standard, the Fifth Circuit held there was sufficient
18. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 166–69 (3d ed. 1999); JAMES J.
WHITE ET AL., 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 79 (6th
ed. 2012).
19. The Texas Business and Commerce Code provides:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though
it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207(a) (West 2009).
20. See id. § 2.207(b)–(c).
21. 703 F. App’x 214 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
22. Id. at 232. The district court opinion is not reported on Westlaw or Lexis. The
quotation is from the Court of Appeals opinion.
23. Id. at 225.
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evidence to support the jury’s verdict.24 The Fifth Circuit further held
there was sufficient evidence to support an implied jury finding that the
purchase order sent by the buyer had been sent by employees of the
buyer who had authority to enter into a contract for the purchase of four-
teen machines, and not merely one machine.25 The district court’s judg-
ment was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor
of the seller on the breach of contract claim.26
Section 2.207 was also addressed in a somewhat unusual situation
where the parties exchanged forms for the sale and purchase of scrap
metal. In Jutalia Recycling, Inc. v. CNA Metals Ltd.,27 a buyer’s purchase
orders provided that the seller was to submit to jurisdiction in Texas. The
seller’s forms specified that the buyer was to submit to jurisdiction in
New York. The seller’s form also provided that it was expressly condi-
tioned on the buyer’s agreement to the seller’s terms, and that no differ-
ing terms in the buyer’s purchase order would become part of the
contract.28 When the first order of scrap arrived at its destination in
China, the buyer determined the material was worthless, and sued the
seller in Texas. The seller entered a special appearance contesting juris-
diction. The trial court denied the special appearance, and the seller ap-
pealed. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that under
§ 2.207, the seller’s forms controlled, and the seller had not assented to
jurisdiction in Texas.29 Despite this conclusion, the court also had to ad-
dress the question of whether the seller had sufficient minimum contacts
with Texas to give the trial court jurisdiction over the seller. On this issue,
the court considered three points which the buyer urged as being suffi-
cient for Texas jurisdiction. First, the seller had made telephone calls to
the buyer in Texas soliciting business. Second, the seller had entered into
three contracts with the buyer. Third, the seller asked the buyer to make
payment by wire transfers to the seller’s New York bank. The court of
appeals held that these contacts, whether taken individually or as a group,
did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts to give the trial court juris-
diction over the seller, particularly where no meetings were held in Texas,
and the goods were shipped to China and not to Texas.30
24. Id. at 226.
25. Id. at 228–29.
26. Id. at 232–33. The Fifth Circuit did, however, uphold the district court’s grant of
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the seller’s alternative claim of tortious interfer-
ence with contract, because the Fifth Circuit determined there was insufficient evidence to
support damages beyond those suffered on the breach of contract claim. Id. at 232.
27. 542 S.W.3d 90 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
28. Id. at 93. By use of this language, the seller was invoking the last clause in
§ 2.207(a) that provides, “[a] definite and seasonable expression of acceptance . . . operates
as an acceptance . . . unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207(a) (West 2009) (emphasis
added).
29. Jutalia Recycling, 542 S.W.3d at 96.
30. Id. at 96–100.
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C. WARRANTIES
Chapter 2 of the Code contains provisions dealing with four warranties
that can arise in a contract for the sale of goods. These include an implied
warranty of good title, express warranties arising from representations by
the seller, an implied warranty of merchantability, and a warranty of fit-
ness for a particular purpose.31 Because actions for breach of warranty
are also enumerated as one of the causes of action that can be brought for
violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the TDTPA), it is
not uncommon for suits to be brought under both the Code and the
TDTPA.32 In GB Tubulars, Inc. v. Union Gas Operating Co.,33 a buyer
purchased couplings from a manufacturer for use in a gas well. The cou-
plings failed to withstand the pressure in the well, and the buyer sued the
manufacturer on several grounds, including breach of express and im-
plied warranties, breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, breach of warranty under the TDTPA, and negligence. The jury
found in favor of the buyer on all of these theories, but also found that
the buyer’s own negligence was responsible for 45% of the damage to the
well. The buyer ultimately decided to recover damages for breach of ex-
press warranties, and to forego recovery on the other theories. On appeal
by the manufacturer, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that
representations made by the manufacturer about the performance char-
acteristics of the couplings constituted express warranties and, based on
expert testimony, those warranties had been breached.34 In reaching this
conclusion, the court of appeals made a curious shift on the issue of cau-
sation. Under the Code, a breach of warranty must proximately cause the
damage for which recovery is sought.35 Under the TDTPA, the breach
need only be a producing cause.36 At one point in the opinion, the court
of appeals held that the evidence supported a finding that the damage to
the well was proximately caused by the manufacturer’s misrepresentation
about the characteristics of the couplings.37 In the next three paragraphs
of the opinion, the court of appeals held that the evidence supported a
finding that the breach of warranty was a producing cause of the dam-
age.38 The opinion does not clearly explain the discussion of producing
cause in light of the buyer’s election to recover for breach of express war-
ranties rather than recovery under the TDTPA.
31. See TEX. BUS. & COM. §§ 2.312–.315 (West 2011).
32. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (West 2011) provides that actions
may be brought under the TDTPA for “breach of an express or implied warranty.”
33. 527 S.W.3d 563, 566–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed).
34. Id. at 571.
35. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715(b)(2) (West 2009) (providing that dam-
ages are recoverable for “injury to persons or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty”).
36. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (West 2011). This section provides,
inter alia, that an action for breach of warranty can be maintained when the breach is “a
producing cause of economic damages. . . .”
37. GB Tubulars, 527 S.W.3d at 570.
38. Id.
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The manufacturer also argued that the jury finding that the buyer’s
negligence was responsible for 45% of the damage should result in a pro-
portionate reduction in the buyer’s damage award. On this issue, the
court of appeals pointed out that Texas law had evolved to treat actions
for breach of express warranties as contract-based actions not subject to
the proportionate responsibility rules in the Texas Civil Practices and
Remedies Code, in contrast to actions for breach of implied warranties to
which the proportionate responsibility rules apply.39 The trial court judg-
ment in favor of the buyer was affirmed.40
In Wildman v. Medtronic, Inc.,41 the district court dismissed the plain-
tiff’s express warranty claim on the ground that it was preempted by the
Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976.42 On appeal by the plaintiff,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court
and held that a representation on a medical device manufacturer’s web-
site constituted an express warranty that was not preempted by the Medi-
cal Device Act Amendments.43 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
preemption applied only to statements that paralleled claims approved by
the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), but did not apply to statements
making promises going beyond those approved by the FDA.44
Tsao v. Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 also involved medically-related
warranty claims, this time in the context of a fertility drug. The plaintiff,
who sought to improve her fertility, used a drug manufactured by the
defendant. In its “Patient Information” and “Prescribing Information”
material, the manufacturer represented that the drug would provide sev-
enty-five International Units of a follicle-stimulating hormone that would
increase the development and release of ovarian eggs. The manufacturer
later learned that some lots of the drug lost potency over time and recal-
led those lots, including lots used by the plaintiff in the course of her
treatment. The plaintiff sued for breach of express warranty, breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability, breach of the implied warranty
39. See id. at 577. The proportionate responsibility rules are set out in TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a)(1) (West 2015). The seminal case establishing that actions
for breach of express warranty are contract actions is Med. City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle
Corp., 251 S.W.3d 55, 60–61 (Tex. 2008) (actions for breach of express warranty are
founded in contract). In Cressman Tubular Prods. Corp. v. Kurt Wiseman Oil & Gas, Ltd.,
322 S.W.3d 453, 459–61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied), the Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals reasoned that implied warranty claims are subject to the
proportionate responsibility rules where the plaintiff was seeking recovery for damage to
property other than economic damage to the product itself. Compare id. with Howard In-
dus., Inc. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., LLC, 403 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2013, no pet.), where the First Houston Court of Appeals held that recovery in an
action for breach of implied warranty was an action founded on contract where the plain-
tiff sought recovery only for economic loss of the product and not for damage to other
property.
40. GB Tubulars, 527 S.W.3d at 579.
41. 874 F.3d 862 (5th Cir. 2017).
42. The Medical Device Act Amendments appear in 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012).
43. Wildman, 874 F.3d at 870.
44. Id. at 869–70.
45. No. 4:16-CV-01724, 2017 WL 746451 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2017), adopted by No. 4:16-
CV-1724, 2017 WL 749009, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2017).
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of fitness for a particular purpose, and for violations of the TDTPA. The
plaintiff sought recovery for economic damages based on the cost she
incurred for the purchase and use of the drug and damages for mental
anguish. The defendant moved to dismiss all claims. The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that based on the state-
ments made in the Prescribing Information, the plaintiff had stated claims
for breach of express warranty and breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, but not for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose.46 As to the TDTPA claims, the district court held
that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege reliance on the Prescribing
Information to meet the requirements of a laundry list violation under
the TDTPA, but she could still seek TDTPA recovery for treble damages
and mental anguish, because her warranty claims were cognizable under
both the Code and the TDTPA.47 On this issue, the district court noted
that the voluntary recall by the manufacturer supported the plaintiff’s
claim that the manufacturer had acted knowingly or intentionally in its
sale of a drug with lower potency than it represented.48 The defendant’s
motion to dismiss the breach of warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose was granted.49 The motion to dismiss the laundry list claims was also
granted, but with leave to amend without prejudice.50 The remaining mo-
tions to dismiss were denied.51
D. REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
When goods have been tendered or delivered by a seller, Section 2.602
of the Code allows a buyer to reject the goods for any non-conformity if
the buyer acts within a reasonable time after the tender or delivery has
been made.52 If the goods have been accepted, the buyer can no longer
reject the goods for “any non-conformity,” but may be able to revoke
acceptance by meeting the more stringent standards provided in Section
46. Id. at *5–8.
47. Id. at *11. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(1)–(33) (West 2009) contains
a list of acts and practices that constitute violations of the Act. This list is commonly re-
ferred to as the “laundry list.” The plaintiff must have relied on the act or practice com-
plained of to maintain a laundry list claim. Id. § 17.50(a)(1)(B).
48. Tsao, 2017 WL 746451, at *11.
49. Id. at *12.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.602(a) provides, “[r]ejection of goods must be within
a reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasona-
bly notifies the seller.”
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2.608.53 In Hess Corp. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp.,54 a buyer purchased
“Subsurface Safety Valves” for a seller for use in oil wells located in the
Gulf of Mexico. The purchase contract warranted the valves for a period
of one year. All other warranties were disclaimed. The valves failed more
than one year after installation. The buyer revoked acceptance and as-
serted claims for breach of warranty and for breach of contract. The seller
moved to dismiss all claims. The U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas had to determine if the buyer’s claims sounded in warranty
or in contract. If the claims were based on a breach of warranty, they
were time-barred, and the buyer could not revoke acceptance on that
ground. On the other hand, if the claims were based on a breach of con-
tract, they were not time-barred and the buyer could revoke accept-
ance.55 In a carefully written opinion, the district court noted that the
warranty/contract distinction was a “murky area of law.”56 The district
court reasoned that the contract terms required the seller to deliver
valves that conformed to the specifications of various organizations that
established standards for oil well equipment.57 The district also reasoned,
however, that the seller did not warrant that the valves would function for
an indefinite time, but had clearly limited the warranty to a period of one
year.58 The district court concluded that the buyer’s allegation were suffi-
cient to state a claim for revocation based on the failure of the valves to
conform to the contract, but could not pursue a breach of warranty claim
because of the one-year limitation stated in the seller’s warranty.59 The
seller’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim was denied, but
53. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.608 provides:
(a) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(1) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be
cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(2) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was rea-
sonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before accept-
ance or by the seller’s assurances.
(b) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before
any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by
their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of
it.
(c) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the
goods involved as if he had rejected them.
54. No. CV-H-16-3415, 2017 WL 2829697 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2017).
55. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.725(a) provides a four-year statute of limitations for
breach of a contract for the sale of goods.
56. Hess, 2017 WL 2829697, at *5. The difficulty surrounding the warranty/contract
distinction has arisen in other contexts as well. See cases cited supra note 39.
57. Hess, 2017 WL 2829697, at *6. The contract provided, in part, that “[c]ontractor
[the seller’s] equipment shall comply with the latest editions of applicable standards and
specification, e.g.,—API, ASME, ANSI, ASTM, ASNT, ISO, etc., as required by local/
federal regulations, specified by the Company [the buyer] or identified within the Con-
tract.” Id. at *1.
58. Id. at *7.
59. Id.
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was granted on the breach of warranty claim.60 As to the breach of con-
tract claim, the district court noted that determining if the valves did not
conform to the contract specifications was a fact issue that could not be
resolved on a motion to dismiss.61
IV. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. ENFORCEMENT OF INSTRUMENTS
Under Texas law, it is clear that when a note is secured by a lien on real
property, the lienholder has the right to enforce the lien against the prop-
erty by nonjudicial foreclosure without producing the note.62 But, if the
lienholder seeks to recover on the note, the right to enforce the note must
be established by showing the claimant falls within one of the three cate-
gories listed in Section 3.301 of the Code.63 Two cases decided during the
Survey period illustrate both of these rules.
In Brock v. RJT Property and Management, LLC,64 on a wrongful fore-
closure claim brought by the plaintiff, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
lienholder was required to produce the note to affect a valid nonjudicial
foreclosure.65 In contrast to Brock, the plaintiff in Waterfall Victoria
Master Fund Ltd. v. Avery66 sued for judicial foreclosure and enforce-
ment of the note. Based on its possession of the note and an allonge con-
taining a blank indorsement, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment,
contending that it was the holder of the note and had the right to enforce
it.67 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas disagreed,
pointing out there were unexplained discrepancies in how the note had
been transferred by the payee through a series of transfers, some of which
included the backdating of assignments.68 Noting that the plaintiff failed
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. After the economic downturn in 2008, numerous cases applied this rule in Texas
foreclosure cases. See, e.g., Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 735 F.3d 220, 226 n.12
(5th Cir. 2013); Martins v. BAC Home Loans Serv., L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2013);
Johnson-Williams v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-3927-M (BH), 2015 WL 4997811, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2015); Aguero v. Ramirez, 70 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2002, pet. denied); Morlock, L.L.C. v. Bank of N.Y., 448 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
63. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 3.301 (West 2002) provides that a “‘Person entitled to
enforce’ an instrument means (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in posses-
sion of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of
the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to § 3.309 or § 3.418(d).”
64. No. 3:16-CV-1545-G-BH, 2016 WL 7665881 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2016), adopted by
2017 WL 76909, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2017).
65. Id. at *4. A similar result was reached in Aguilar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
3:16-cv-211-K-BN, 2017 WL 1450622, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL
1436962, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2017).
66. No. 3:16-CV-0173-B, 2017 WL 477313 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2017).
67. An indorsement in blank makes an instrument bearer paper under TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE § 3.205(b) that can be transferred by possession alone without the need for
further indorsement.
68. Avery, 2017 WL 477313, at *4.
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to produce any evidence showing the chain of title by which it acquired
the note, the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment because the gaps in the chain of title raised an issue of material
fact.69
In Khoury v. Tomlinson,70 an investor loaned money to an oil trading
company. The loan was evidenced by a note. When the company failed to
make any payments on the note, the investor met with the company’s
president to discuss repayment. The parties agreed that the president
would personally repay the debt. After the meeting, the investor sent an
email to the president to confirm their agreement. The president re-
sponded with an email that said, “We are in agreement.” No payments
were made by the president, and the investor sued for breach of contract,
Texas Securities Act violations, and common law fraud.71 The president
defended the breach of contract claim on the ground that his contract of
guaranty was not signed by him as required by Section 26.01 of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code.72 He defended the Securities Act claim
on the theory that the note was not a security, but a commercial loan, and
defended the fraud claim on the ground that the investor had acknowl-
edged receipt of all information about the investment. The jury found in
favor of the investor for the entire amount of his loan. The trial court
entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the president on
all counts.
On appeal, the First Houston Court of Appeals reasoned that because
the president’s name and email address appeared in the “From” field in
his email, the signature requirement of Section 26.01 was satisfied under
the Texas Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (UETA).73 The president
argued that even if his name and address satisfied the signature require-
ment, it did not show his intent to be bound. On this point, the court of
appeals held that his affirmative response that the parties were “in agree-
69. Id.
70. 518 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
71. Id. at 572. The Texas Securities Act appears in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
581-33 (West 2010).
72. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a)(1)–(2), (b)(2) (West 2015) requires
promises to repay the debt of another to be in a writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought. Guarantors may be liable as accommodation parties under TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(a) (West 2002) by signing the instrument itself or outside
of the Code by signing a separate contract of guaranty. If the liability is based on a signa-
ture on the instrument, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 3.104(a) and 3.103(a)(7) contain what
is, in effect, its own statute of frauds. If the liability is based on a separate contract of
guaranty, the writing and signature requirements are stated in TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 26.01(a)(1)–(2), (b)(2) (West 2015). Discharge of accommodation parties is gov-
erned by TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.605 (West 2002). Discharge of guarantors on
separate contracts of guaranty are governed by the principles stated in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (AM. LAW INST. 1996). TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
§ 3.605, cmt.1 points out that the rules in that section “essentially parallel modern interpre-
tations of the law of suretyship and guaranty that apply when a secondary obligor is not a
party to an instrument.”
73. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 579. The Texas Uniform Electronic Transaction Act, com-
monly referred to as UETA, appears as TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 322.001–.021
(West 2015).
116 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
ment” showed his intent to be bound.74 In regard to the Securities Act
claim, the court of appeals held that because the note included an obliga-
tion to pay 10% of the net profits from the venture, as well as the pay-
ment of the debt and interest, it was a security rather than a commercial
loan.75 The court of appeals also held that the evidence supported the
jury’s verdict in favor of the investor on the fraud claim.76 The judgment
of the trial court was reversed on the substantive issues and the case re-
manded for a new trial on the investor’s claim for recovery of attorney
fees.77
When an instrument is made payable to more than one person, ques-
tions can arise about whether the instrument can be transferred by the
indorsement of a single payee, or whether all of the payees must indorse
to make a transfer effective.78 If the instrument is payable to the payees
in the alternative, any one of them can indorse and transfer the instru-
ment.79 If it is payable jointly, all of the payees must indorse.80 In Gusma
Properties, L.P. v. Travelers Lloyds Insurance Co.,81 the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals addressed a variation on the issue of jointly
payable checks. In Gusma, several buildings were damaged in a hurri-
cane. An insurer issued a check made payable to the building owners and
to their attorney. While it was clear that this was a jointly payable check,
it was indorsed only by the attorney, and the building owners received
none of the funds. The building owners sued the insurer for failing to
promptly pay their claims as required by the Texas Insurance Code.82 The
court of appeals held that the usual rule requiring the indorsement of all
payees on a jointly payable check did not apply when one of the payees
was acting as an agent for the other payees.83 Because the attorney was
acting as an agent for the other payees, his receipt and indorsement of the
check constituted an effective delivery of the insurance proceeds and sat-
74. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 579.
75. Id. at 582.
76. Id. at 583.
77. Id. at 585.
78. See Allied Capital Partners, L.P. v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 68 S.W.3d 51, 53 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (discussing application of TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.110(d) (West 2002) to determine if ambiguous instruments are payable jointly or in the
alternative); see also Mazon Assocs., Inc. v. Comerica Bank, 195 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (same).
79. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.110(d) (West 2002); see also McAllen Hos-
pitals, L.P. v. State Farm Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex., 433 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2014)
(drawer of check remains liable to non-indorsing co-payee when check is made jointly
payable and only one of the payees indorses the check). The non-indorsing co-payee may
also have a conversion claim against subsequent transferees under TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE § 3.420(a), or a common law claim against the payee who indorsed the instrument
and kept the proceeds.
80. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 3.110(d).
81. 514 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
82. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.051–.061 (West 2009), which requires insurers to
pay claims within a specified series of times. Id. § 542.054. Failure to meet these require-
ments can result in additional damages. Id. § 542.058.
83. Gusma, 514 S.W.3d at 327–28.
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isfied the prompt payment requirements of the Texas Insurance Code.84
Summary judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed.85
B. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BANKS AND THEIR CUSTOMERS
In Villarreal v. First Presidio Bank,86 the plaintiff sought to redeem five
certificates of deposit he had in a safe deposit box. The certificates had
been issued by a predecessor of the bank in 1983 and 1984. The bank
refused payment, contending that the certificates had already been re-
deemed. In an action by the plaintiff to obtain the funds, the bank de-
fended on the ground that Texas law presumes payment to have been
made on a debt if no demand for payment is made for at least twenty
years between the time when a claimant first has the right to enforce an
obligation and the time when enforcement is sought. In an interesting
opinion exploring the history and origins of the presumption, the district
court could find no cases applying the presumption of payment to a
bank’s refusal to redeem a certificate of deposit.87 In its review of the
record, the district court reasoned that a customer could reasonably be-
lieve that an automatically-renewing certificate of deposit would remain
valid regardless of the passage of time.88 Furthermore, even if the pre-
sumption of payment applied, the certificates themselves were adequate
to rebut the presumption.89 The district court also rejected the bank’s
arguments that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by any statutes of limita-
tions or by laches because the plaintiff had filed suit well within the statu-
tory time limits and had not acted with “unreasonable delay” in asserting
his claims.90 The bank’s final arguments in support of its motion focused
on its recordkeeping requirements, its internal policies, and the possibility
that the certificates had been redeemed by the plaintiff’s first wife who
had died in 1986. The district court held that none of the evidence ad-
duced by the bank was sufficient to support summary judgment, and that
questions of material fact remained.91 The bank’s motion for summary
judgment was denied.92
Identity theft has become an unfortunate fact of life in the modern
world. Stolen credit card data, theft of personal information, tax fraud,
and bank fraud are only a few of the ways in which fraudsters make off
with billions of dollars each year.93 In 2017, the takeover of bank ac-
84. Id. at 330.
85. Id. at 331.
86. No. EP-15-CV-88-KC, 2017 WL 1063563 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2017).
87. Id. at *5.
88. Id. at *6.
89. Id. at *7.
90. Id. at *9–10.
91. Id. at *11–12.
92. Id. at *12.
93. See Identity Fraud High with 15.4 Million U.S. Victims in 2016, Up 16 Percent Ac-
cording to New Javelin Strategy + Research Study, JAVELIN (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www
.javelinstrategy.com/press-release/identity-fraud-hits-record-high-154-million-us-victims-
2016-16-percent-according-new [https://perma.cc/LD8H-T9D5] (compiling statistics on re-
ported identity fraud).
118 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
counts, or the opening of new accounts by fraudsters, ranked fourth
among the various types of reported fraud.94 Giovinale v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A.95 is a recent example of a bank account takeover that
left the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas with the
task of allocating the loss between a customer and her bank. In Giovinale,
the customer, a resident of Venezuela, had an account at a Texas branch
of a national bank. Before moving to Venezuela in 2011, she received
monthly account statements at her address in the United States. After
moving to Venezuela, the statements arrived only “sporadically,” but she
did not contact the bank about her failure to receive statements. Between
January and March 2013, seven wire transfers were made from her ac-
count. In January 2013, at the telephone request of an unknown person,
the bank changed the address for the account to Miami, Florida. Accord-
ing to the bank employee who received the request, the caller answered
all of the security questions to identify the caller as the owner of the ac-
count. New checks and account statements were sent to the Miami ad-
dress in March 2013. Between March and August 2013, eighteen
fraudulent checks were allegedly paid from the customer’s account. In
August 2013, the customer notified the bank about the twenty-five alleg-
edly fraudulent withdrawals. The bank refused to reimburse the funds
because of the customer’s failure to comply with the terms of the account
agreement. In an action by the customer on a variety of theories, the
bank moved for summary judgment on all claims.96
Much of the district court’s analysis focused on the account agreement.
As to the seven wire transfers, the district court held that the customer
failed to notify the bank within thirty days after the bank sent account
statements to her or made them available by online banking.97 As to the
eighteen allegedly unauthorized checks, the situation was more complex
because the customer argued that she had six months to notify the bank
about the checks, since the deposit agreement provided a separate time
period to report unauthorized “endorsements.”98 The district court re-
94. See Cory Warren, How Common Is Identity Theft?, LIFELOCK (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.lifelock.com/education/how-common-is-identity-theft/ [https://perma.cc/
G2A9-4P8N].
95. No. CV-H-16-986, 2017 WL 3535440 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2017).
96. Id. at *2. In her original complaint, the plaintiff asserted claims for breach of com-
mon law and statutory warranties, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, violation of
the TDTPA, and conversion under TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.420 (West 2002). Id.
In an earlier proceeding, the bank moved to dismiss all but the § 3.420 claim, and the
district court granted the motion to dismiss with leave for the plaintiff to amend without
prejudice. See Giovinale v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV-H-16-986, 2017 WL
1092312, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2017). In the later proceeding discussed here, the district
court dealt with the bank’s motion for summary judgment. Giovinale, 2017 WL 3535440, at
*1.
97. Giovinale, 2017 WL 3535440, at *6. The account agreement read, in part, “[y]ou
must notify us in writing within 30 days after we mail a statement or otherwise make a
statement available (for example paperless statements) if: An item that you did not author-
ize or is altered is listed on the statement . . . .” Id. at *5.
98. Id. at *6. On this issue, the account agreement stated, “[y]ou must notify us in
writing of any unauthorized, improper, or missing endorsements within 6 months after the
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jected this argument because the deposit agreement itself contained ex-
amples of how checks are “endorsed,” and the Code excludes signatures
of the drawer from the definition of “indorsement.”99 This did not end
the matter, however, because the customer did report the last five of the
eighteen checks within thirty days after a statement of account was sent
to her. The bank defended its refusal to reimburse the account for these
checks under the “repeat wrongdoer” rule in Section 4.406(d) of the
Code.100 As to these checks, the district court ruled that the customer had
raised an issue of material fact on her breach of contract claim regarding
her compliance with the thirty day time period required to report unau-
thorized drawer signatures, on her conversion claim for forged indorse-
ments on two of the checks, and on application of the repeat wrongdoer
rule to the same two checks because they were made payable to different
payees.101 The district court granted summary judgment for the bank on
most of the plaintiff’s claims, but denied summary judgment for the bank
on claims based on the last five checks paid from the account.102
Attorneys who represent financial institutions should carefully review
the decisions in Giovinale and in Calleja-Ahedo v. Compass Bank,103
which also involved the takeover of a bank account and use of a deposit
agreement to allocate loss between a customer and a bank. Both cases
illustrate the importance of a well-drafted deposit agreement.
account statement is mailed or made available.” Id. at *5. The difference in the Code spell-
ing of the word “indorsement” in Chapters 3 & 4 of the Code and the spelling of “endorse-
ment” used in the deposit agreement was noted in Perini Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of
Habersham County, Georgia, in the following terms:
The P.E.G. stamp employed by banks stands for “Prior endorsements guar-
anteed.” While the Uniform Commercial Code, as will be seen, frequently
fails to provide clear answers to questions in the area of negotiable instru-
ments, it is unequivocal in its insistence that indorsement is to be spelled with
the letter “i”. Bankers, who claim to know much of such weighty matters,
may insist on beginning with “e”, but this practice could be attributed to the
bankers’ understandable reluctance to stamp “Pay any Bank PIG” on the
backs of the checks they handle.
Perini Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Habersham Cty., GA, 553 F.2d 398, 401 n.1 (5th Cir.
1977).
99. Giovinale, 2017 WL 3535440, at *6. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.204(a)
(West 2002) provides, in part, that, “‘Indorsement’ means a signature, other than that of a
signer as maker, drawer, or acceptor, that . . . is made . . . for the purpose of (i) negotiating
the instrument . . . .”
100. Giovinale, 2017 WL 3535440 at *9. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 4.406(c), (d)(2)
provides, in effect, that if the same wrongdoer forges the drawer’s name on a series of
checks, the drawer is precluded from asserting a claim for all but the first check in the
series if the drawer delays in reporting the forgeries for more than thirty days on items paid
after the customer has a reasonable opportunity to know about the first forgery in the
series.
101. Giovinale, 2017 WL 3535440at *7, *9. If the repeat wrongdoer rule did not apply to
these two checks, the plaintiff would be able to assert a conversion claim under TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE § 3.420 for payment of the checks on forged indorsements and the longer
six-month time period allowed under the deposit agreement to assert forged indorsement
claims.
102. Id. at *11.
103. 508 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. granted). Callja-Ahedo
was discussed in the 2017 Survey. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 3 SMU
ANN. TEX. SURVEY 101, 119–21 (2017).
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V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. CREATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
To create an enforceable security interest under the Code, there must
be an agreement between the debtor and the secured party granting a
security interest in described collateral, the secured party must give value,
and the debtor must have rights in the collateral.104 If the value given by
the secured party is used by the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral,
the security interest is called a “purchase-money security interest” that
may give the secured party priority over non-purchase money security
interests in the same collateral.105 In 2005, Congress amended the Bank-
ruptcy Code to include a special provision dealing with purchase-money
security interests in Chapter 13 proceedings.106 This provision, generally
called the “hanging paragraph,” requires bankruptcy courts to determine
if value given by the secured party in connection with a motor vehicle
financing transaction within 910 days of a bankruptcy filing qualifies as a
purchase-money security interest, or if the claim should be treated as an
unsecured claim that can be “crammed down” by the debtor in a Chapter
13 plan.107
In In re Villarreal108 and In re McPhilamy,109 the debtors purchased
motor vehicles for personal use within 910 days before filing a Chapter 13
bankruptcy. In both cases, the loans were cross-collateralized, and part of
the money was used for purposes other than payment of the price of the
vehicles. The debtors argued that the loans were not subject to the hang-
ing paragraph and that they were entitled to bifurcate and cram down the
loans under their Chapter 13 plans. In both cases, applying Fifth Circuit
precedent In re Dale,110 the bankruptcy courts agreed with the debtors,
and concluded that cross-collateralization, and use of funds for non-
purchase money purposes, meant that the loans were not covered by the
hanging paragraph and were, therefore, unsecured loans that could be
crammed down.111 In both cases, the bankruptcy courts confirmed the
debtors’ Chapter 13 plans.112
In Carmel Financial Corp., Inc. v. Castro,113 the secured party financed
104. These requirements are stated in TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(b) (West
2011).
105. Purchase-money security interests are defined in TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
§ 9.103(a)–(b). The priority rules applicable to purchase-money security interests are con-
tained in TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.324.
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2010) amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306, 119 Stat. 23, 80.
107. Id. The “hanging paragraph” has been described as having “no alphanumeric des-
ignation and merely dangles at the end of [11 U.S.C.] § 1325(a). There is no way to cite to
this provision other than its proximity to other citable provisions.” Dianne C. Kerns, Cram-
a-lot: The Quest Continues, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10 (2005).
108. 566 B.R. 859 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017).
109. 566 B.R. 382 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017).
110. 582 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2009).
111. In re Villarreal, 566 B.R. at 869; In re McPhilamy, 566 B.R. at 395.
112. In re Villareal, 566 B.R. at 869; In re McPhilarmy, 566 B.R. at 396.
113. 514 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
2018] Commercial Transactions 121
a home water treatment system. Because the water treatment system was
installed on real property, the secured party perfected its interest by mak-
ing a fixture filing in the real estate records in the county where the real
property was located.114 After the debtor defaulted on his home loan and
on the water treatment system loan, the home loan was foreclosed and
rights in the home were transferred to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). The secured party sought compensation for
the balance due on the water treatment system loan, but HUD offered to
pay only $1,000 of the amount due. This offer was rejected, and the se-
cured party filed suit to recover the balance remaining on its loan. The
secured party argued that making a fixture filing to perfect its purchase-
money security interest gave it priority as provided in Section 9.334 of the
Code, and that its interest could be enforced as a lien on the realty as
provided in Section 9.604 of the Code.115 In a carefully written opinion,
the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reasoned that, while a secured
party could obtain a priority claim to fixtures, and could enforce that
claim as a lien on the real estate, neither section dealt with the issue of
whether the security agreement itself granted a lien on the realty.116 As
to this issue, the court of appeals held that the description of collateral in
the security agreement only granted a security interest in the water treat-
ment system, and did not grant a security interest or lien on the real prop-
erty.117 The court of appeals further reasoned that including a description
of the realty in the financing statement merely complied with the require-
ments needed to make a fixture filing and did not extend the fixture claim
to any property beyond that described in the security agreement.118
B. PRIORITIES
In City of Galveston v. Consolidated Concepts, Inc.,119 the City of Gal-
veston (the City) found itself in possession of more than $700,000 when
several checks it had issued to a contractor to pay for repairs to buildings
damaged by Hurricane Ike were never cashed, and the funds remained in
the City’s account. Because numerous entities asserted claims to the
funds, the City filed an interpleader in state trial court to have the court
determine priorities in the funds.
114. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.502(b) (West 2011), which states the re-
quirements for a fixture filing. Unlike an ordinary UCC-1 financing statement, a fixture
filing requires a description of the collateral along with a description of the real estate. Id.
115. By complying with the requirements of TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.334(d), a
purchase-money security interest in fixtures can obtain priority in the fixtures over the
competing claims of a prior encumbrancer or owner. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.604(b)
permits enforcement of a fixture security interest as an interest in personal property under
Chapter 9, or by complying with the real property rules for enforcing a lien on real
property.
116. Castro, 514 S.W.3d at 296.
117. Id. at 296–97.
118. Id. at 297.
119. 274 F. Supp. 3d 687 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017).
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The competing claimants included the United States, a surety, a lender,
and multiple subcontractors. The United States removed the action to
federal court and moved for summary judgment, asserting it was entitled
to the entire fund because a federal tax lien had attached to all of the
property and to all rights in property belonging to the general contractor.
The surety had executed a UCC-1 financing statement to perfect its
agreement with the contractor, and it asserted that it was entitled to the
funds because it had suffered significant losses on the bonds it issued to
the contractor. The lender argued that it was entitled to the funds because
the contractor signed both a security agreement and a promissory note
which granted the lender a security interest in the contractor’s “accounts
receivable, contract rights, and compensation.”120 The subcontractors al-
leged that they were entitled to the funds under Section 162 of the Texas
Construction Trust Fund Act.121 The United States moved for summary
judgment.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the
United States was entitled to the interpled funds because, under § 6321 of
the Internal Revenue Code, the United States is afforded a lien for delin-
quent taxes “upon all property and rights to property.”122 The other
claimants argued that the funds were not the general contractor’s “prop-
erty” and, therefore, § 6321 did not apply. The district court determined
that it should first look to state law to determine the general contractor’s
rights and then look to federal law to determine if those rights qualified
as property rights.123 The district court rejected the lender’s argument
that the interpled funds met the definition of “accounts” because the
lender did not provide sufficient evidence to prove an “account” existed
for summary judgment purposes.124 The surety also lacked sufficient sum-
mary judgment evidence because it focused on losses the general contrac-
tor incurred on projects performed in Arizona rather than Texas.125
Finally, the subcontractors’ argument that the Texas Construction Trust
Fund Act applied was rejected because mere delivery of checks that were
never cashed did not constitute payment under the Act.126 Moreover, the
City was not a contractor or subcontractor, so it was not covered by the
Texas Construction Trust Fund Act.127 The district court held that the
United States tax lien had priority for the entire amount of the interpled
funds.128
120. Id. at 690.
121. Under the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act, payments made to a contractor are
held in trust for the benefit of subcontractors and materialmen. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 162.001–.003 (West 2014).
122. City of Galveston, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 691; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2017).
123. City of Galveston, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 693.




128. Id. at 695.
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The decision in In re SemCrude, L.P.129 probably represents the last
chapter in the effort by unpaid oil producers in Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Texas to recoup losses resulting from the 2008 bankruptcy of the Sem-
Crude Group. In three earlier decisions, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Delaware held that a group of lending banks had priority
over the producers’ claims to oil and gas production and to the proceeds
of production.130 The bankruptcy court reasoned that the producers
failed to perfect their interests by making UCC filings or obtaining con-
trol of bank accounts in the jurisdiction of the debtor as required by
U.C.C. Section 9-301(1).131 In the three earlier decisions, the producers
reserved the right to proceed against downstream producers, pending the
outcome of certified appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Ultimately, the appeals were settled and no decision was ren-
dered by the Third Circuit.132
In this latest round of litigation by the producers against downstream
purchasers, the cases did reach the Third Circuit, and the Third Circuit
upheld the decisions of the bankruptcy court finding in favor of the down-
stream purchasers.133 The Third Circuit reasoned that the producers
failed to perfect security interests in the oil and gas production as re-
quired by U.C.C. Section 9-301(1), and this gave the downstream pur-
chasers priority as buyers for value under U.C.C. Section 9-317(b).134 The
Third Circuit rejected arguments by the producers that their security in-
terests were created and automatically perfected under non-uniform pro-
ducer lien statutes enacted in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.135
C. FILING FALSE FINANCING STATEMENTS
As part of its adoption of the Code provisions governing secured trans-
actions, Texas added a non-uniform Section 9.5185 to provide a remedy
129. 864 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2017).
130. The opinions affecting producers in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas are reported
respectively in In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. 82, 110 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); In re Sem-
Crude, L.P., 407 B.R. 140, 157 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); and In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R.
112, 130–31 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
131. U.C.C. § 9.301(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. ST. LAWS
2017) provides, with some exceptions, that when a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the
local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection and priority of security interests. See In re
SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. at 110; In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. at 158; In re SemCrude,
L.P., 407 B.R. at 139. The Official Text of U.C.C. § 9-301(1) was enacted in identical form
in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-301(1); 12A OKLA. STAT.
ANN. § 1-9-301(1) (West 2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(1) (West 2011).
132. In re SemCrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2013).
133. In re SemCrude, 864 F.3d at 301.
134. Id. at 300. U.C.C. § 9-317(b) provides, in part, that a buyer for value who takes
possession of goods takes free of a security interest if the buyer gives value and receives
delivery without knowledge of the security interest before it is perfected. As with UCC
Section 9-301(1), this section was adopted without change in Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Texas. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-317(b); 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1-9-317(b); TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 9.317(b) (West 2011).
135. In re SemCrude, L.P., 864 F.3d at 300–01. The non-uniform producer lien statutes
appear in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-339a, OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 52, §§ 570.1–.15; and TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343 (West 2011).
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against anyone who files a false financing statement purporting to show
that the filer has a security interest in the aggrieved party’s assets.136 In
Quintanilla v. West,137 the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed an
interesting question involving the intersection of Section 9.5185 and the
Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).138 This Act is the Texas version
of “Anti-Slapp” legislation intended to allow expedited dismissal of
claims affecting a defendant’s right to communicate on matters of public
concern.139 In general, if the defendant moves to dismiss an action on the
basis of the Act, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing on each
element of the complaint.140 Failing to support each element with such
evidence will result in dismissal.141 Absent exceptional circumstances, dis-
covery is suspended until a hearing on the motion to dismiss has been
held.142
In Quintanilla, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant filed false financ-
ing statements with the Texas Secretary of State and in the real estate
records of a county clerk claiming a security interest in the plaintiff’s per-
sonal property, and a lien on the plaintiff’s oil and gas leases and mineral
interests in the county where the lien was filed.143 According to the plain-
tiff, the filings violated the provisions of Section 9.5185 and also consti-
tuted a slander of the plaintiff’s title to the assets covered by the financing
statements. After filing an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, the defen-
dant moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint violated the
TCPA. The trial court ruled that the filing of a financing statement was a
protected act under the TCPA, but ultimately denied the motion to dis-
miss. On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that the TCPA applied be-
cause filing financing statements was an exercise of free speech and an
exercise of the right to petition.144 The court of appeals, however, dis-
agreed with the trial court on whether the plaintiff had established a
prima facie case.145 On this issue, the court of appeals held that the plain-
136. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.5185. This section provides, in part:
(a) A person may not intentionally or knowingly present for filing or cause
to be presented for filing a financing statement that the person knows:
(1) is forged;
(2) contains a material false statement; or
(3) is groundless.
Subsections (b)–(d) provide penalties and a right to specific relief, including release of the
financing statement if the plaintiff prevails.
137. 534 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. filed).
138. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001–.011 (West 2015).
139. See id. § 27.001; see generally Laura Lee Prather, A Primer on the Texas Anti-
SLAPP Statute, SLAPPEDINTEXAS.COM, https://slappedintexas.com/primer/ [https://perma
.cc/E7PN-EXQK] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018); Laura Prather, The Texas Citizens Participa-
tion Act – Five Years After Passage, HAYNESBOONE.COM, http://www.haynesboone.com/~/
media/files/attorney%20publications/2016/antislapp_5yr.ashx [https://perma.cc/WTY3-
AKMW] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
140. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c) (West 2015).
141. See id. § 27.004–.006.
142. See id. § 27.003(c).
143. Quintanilla, 534 S.W.3d at 38–42.
144. Id. at 45–46.
145. Id. at 50.
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tiff’s use of extrinsic evidence contradicting the terms of the underlying
security agreement and note could not be used to support his allegation
that the financing statements were wrongful under Section 5185 of the
Code, or that the filings constituted a slander of title.146 The trial court’s
judgment was reversed with instructions to grant the defendant’s motion
to dismiss and to allow recovery of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses to
the defendant.147
VI. CONCLUSION
Cases reported during the Survey period once again covered a spec-
trum of issues arising under the Code. While many of the cases involved
application of established precedent, others addressed new issues or
sharpened the analysis provided in earlier case law. In this latter category,
a few cases deserve special note. In regard to the sale of goods, Hess v.
Schlumberger Tech. Corp.148 is of interest on whether an action should be
treated as a claim for breach of contract or a claim for breach of war-
ranty. In regard to the relationship between customers and banks, Gi-
ovinale v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.149 and Calleja-Ahedo v. Compass
Bank,150 are must-reads for guidance in drafting effective deposit agree-
ments. In the area of secured transactions, Quintanilla v. West151 is a sig-
nificant decision dealing with the intersection of the Code and the Texas
Citizens Participation Act in the context of commercial litigation.
146. Id. at 49–50.
147. Id. at 50–51.
148. No. CV-H-16-3415, 2017 WL 2829697 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2017).
149. No. CV-H-16-986, 2017 WL 3535440 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2017).
150. 508 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. granted).
151. 534 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. filed).
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